NOTES

¹ See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, PLO, <http://www.pna.net/plo/pal> (stating that the PLO was established in Jerusalem in 1964, after the first meeting of the League of Arab States and the Palestine National Council.) Furthermore, the Palestinian National Authority ("PNA") was created during Oslo I to implement the Oslo Accords. See id.

² Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 [hereinafter the Memorandum].

³ The Memorandum does not supersede any of the previous agreements between Israel and the PLO, including the Declaration of Principles ("Oslo I") signed in 1993, and the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, first signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 and then revised in 1995 in the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza ("Oslo II").

⁴ See id. art. 2, § B (3) (stating that "a high-ranking U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet as required and not less than biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations"). See also In the Wake of Wye, The Economist Oct. 30, 1998 <http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/current> (discussing the Memorandum providing for "the intimate and intrusive involvement of the CIA in monitoring action against terrorism").

⁵ The West Bank and the Gaza Strip [hereinafter the Palestinian Territories or Territories].

⁶ Memorandum, supra note 4, art. III § 1 ("The Israeli and Palestinian sides reaffirm their commitment to enhancing their relationship and agree on the need actively to promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, the parties agree to continue or to reactivate all standing committees established by the Interim Agreement, including the Monitories and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), the Civil Affairs Committee (CAC), the Legal Committee, and the Standing Cooperation Committee").

⁷ See Mel Levine, Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo Agreements, 19 Fordham L.J. 1393, 1406 (1996) [hereinafter Levine] (Since 1993 terrorist attacks on Israel threatened the peace process many times, and "the Palestinian leadership will find no solution to its economic crisis without recognizing legitimate Israeli concerns in this area. It is a classic political/economic conundrum").

⁸ See The Prime Ministers of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il> (stating that Yitzhak Rabin held the post of Prime Minister 1974-1977 & 1992-1995) He was assassinated in the Spring of 1995. See id.

⁹ Chairman of the Palestinian Authority.

¹⁰ See Measures to Improve the Welfare of the Population of the Territories, Israel Foreign Ministry, Information Division, art. 1 §(a)(b), (Feb. 22, 1993) <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/land> [hereinafter Measures] ("Civil Administration is responsible for the administration of civilian activities in the territories, for the welfare and in the better interest of the Arab population, the provision of public services and their operation"). Also, "the Civil Administration is responsible for the provision of economic and social services in the territories (education, health, welfare, development, etc.), endeavors to improve those services and raise the standard of living of the Arab population"). See id. Art. 10, § B (providing steps to "improve the overall atmosphere, creating a more investment-attractive environment, for local and foreign investors").

¹¹ See Fidler, Peace Through Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade Law During the Peace Process, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 155 (1998). See also Odin K. Knudsen, Beyond the Israeli Election: Bringing Forth a Sustainable Palestinian Economy, 1 Palestine Econ. Pulse 21 (May-June 1996) (arguing that "without an economically viable Palestinian entity, the Palestinians will become more impoverished, breeding more resentment and hostility towards Israel").

¹² See note 8, (stating that Shimon Peres held the post of the Prime Minister in 1984-1986 & 1995-1996).

¹³ See Levine, supra note 7, at 1393 (citing Shimon Peres).

¹⁴ See id. at 1394, 1400 (arguing that "sectors like industry and tourism are natural outlets for the expression of any pent-up Palestinian commercial energies"). Levine also argues that "the extent that the absence of self-rule has restricted growth in these areas, the new Palestinian autonomy agreements may indeed point to a significant Palestinian economic growth potential." See id.

¹⁵ See Palestinian National Authority, "Closure of the West Bank and Gaza" (Aug.-Sept. 1997) (describing different closures administered by Israel). A comprehensive closure prevents movement of Palestinian goods and people into or through Israel, West Bank and Gaza, even if they do not pass through Israeli-controlled areas. During a full closure Israeli officials check cars and passengers, and people traveling on foot through Israeli-controlled areas, and into Israel. Palestinians must have Israeli citizenship or present a Jerusalem identification card, otherwise, they cannot enter Israel. Internal closure disallows Palestinian movement from Palestinian areas into Israeli-controlled areas, generally isolating Palestinian towns from one another. Israeli soldiers must check persons and vehicles, and generally, alternative routs of entrance to or from Israel and within the Territories are blocked. See id.

¹⁶ See USAID, West Bank and Gaza Mission (explaining that Palestinian economy has special circumstances, including "predominance of small and microenterprises; significant dependence on Israel for access to markets for labor and goods; and the absence of a modern legal and regulatory framework governing business transactions").

¹⁷ Henry Siegman, U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process: Report on an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations (1998) (stating that "instead of improved economic conditions for the Palestinians on the ground, income has declined by nearly a third since the Oslo Accords"). Blame for this is widely spread: "Palestinian Authority mismanagement and corruption (including governmental monopolies), Israeli closures of labor markets, and disappointing international aid." See id. See also Fidler, infra note 119 (stating that foreign investors consider markets of Israel and Jordan to be more attractive because of their prosperity and stability).

¹⁸ See James Phillips, The Floundering Oslo Peace Process, Heritage Found. Executive Memorandum No. 528 (May 22, 1998) [hereinafter Phillips] ("Netanyahu considers peace to be a goal, not a process. Continued Palestinian terrorism, not Netanyahu, is the primary obstacle to peace"). Since then, Palestinian terrorists have slaughtered more than 260 Israelis, while 209 Israelis have been murdered in the decade before the signing of the Oslo agreement. See id. See also David Bar-Illan, Oslo Dead or Alive, Jerusalem Post, (Sept. 11, 1998) <http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/library/misc> [hereinafter Bar-Illan]

¹⁹ See Munter S. Dajani, An Economy Under Siege: A Palestinian View, PNA Special Reports, (Sep. 1997) [hereinafter Dajani] (stating that the first major Israeli closure of the Territories was conducted after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when Palestinians could not enter Israel for work). See also Levine, supra note 7, at 1400 (stating that still under Rabin’s administration, Israeli security took precedent to Palestinian economic development, regardless of the consequences to both sides.) See also Bar-Illan, supra note 18 (citing that Shimon Peres, and not Benjamin Netanyahu suspended talks with the Palestinians, canceled the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, and imposed a total closure on the territories.) Benjamin Netanyahu, won the election in 1996, as the Israeli public realized that "territory for terrorism" was unacceptable and Ari Shavit from Ha’aretz newspaper stated that "it was not the rise of Netanyahu which caused the paralysis in the Oslo process, but the paralysis in the Oslo process caused the rise of Netanyahu. See id.

²⁰ See Measures, supra note 10, art. 4 (providing that "every employer in Israel is required to register his employees from the territories, which ensures that those workers receive appropriate wages and social benefits. Today, approximately 70% of those employed in Israel are registered, compared to 30% in the past").

²¹ See Youssef Daoud, Employment Changes for Palestinians in Israel Since Quarter I, 1996, Pales. Econ. Pulse (Mar.-Apr. 1998) [hereinafter Daoud] ("in the first quarter of 1996 during closure and as the number of foreign workers in Israel has increased, the number of Palestinian laborers has decreased, reaching its lowest of 61,000 workers for the year)". In the second quarter of 1996, in the absence of closure, there was a 50% increase of about 25, 395 Palestinian workers. Overall, from 1994 to 1997 the days of closure totaled to about 335 days and contributed to Palestinian losses of 50% of GNP a day, $1.8 million in industry, $3.1 million in exports, and $2.0 million in agriculture.

²² See id. (stating that according to a public opinion poll published in the Jerusalem Post in 1997, because of security concerns the Israeli society does not support using and depending on Palestinian labor). Moreover, Israel employing foreign workers systematically decreases wage rates, effects employment security, and benefits the Israeli labor market. See id.

²³ See Measures, supra note 10, art. 2 § 3 (provides a procedure for Encouragement of Foreign Investments in the Territories, enabling foreign investors to invest a minimum of $100,000 to reside in the territories for an extended period and later gain residency"). Up to January 1993, "25 projects were approved in Gaza and 21 projects were approved in Judea-Samaria." See id. art. 2, § 7 (providing measures for encouragement exports of agricultural and industrial goods from the Territories). In order to increase exports from the Territories, "the fees for trucks crossing the Jordan Bridges have been reduced by over 75%, for agricultural goods, and over 60 for industrial goods." These reductions were added to a "60% reduction of the fee for trucks transporting agricultural goods in 1990." See id.

²⁴ War of 1967.

²⁵ See Oslo II, the Protocol on Economic Relations in Appendices I-III to Annex IV, supra note 3 [hereinafter Economic Protocol].

²⁶ See Fidler, supra note 11, at 162 (stating that before the Economic Protocol, Arab boycott aimed at hurting Israel’s market by punishing businesses dealing with Israel, also had a "devastating effect" on the Palestinian economy). Consequently, the boycott cut off exports from the Territories to the Arab world. See id.

²⁷ See id. at 164 (noting that "while the Economic Protocol did not guarantee the freedom of movement of labor between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the economic effects of the border closures on earnings in the Territories have been painful").

²⁸ See Fidler, supra note 26.

²⁹ See id.

³⁰ See Shaw J. Dallal, The Palestinian Israeli Peace, 22 Syracuse J. Int’l L.& Com. 43 (1996) (describing the Palestinian Authority to be provided for in the Interim Agreement, as a "precursor of a permanent governmental structure for a future Palestinian state").

³¹See supra note 26.

³²See id. at 160 (stating that there are exceptions to the free movement of Palestinian goods into the Israeli market, that apply to some "agricultural goods, including the application of veterinary and phytosanitary measures and quotas on certain agricultural products that will be phased out by 1998").

³³See id.

³⁴See id.

³⁵See David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: an Analysis of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 Fordham Int’l L.J. 529, 548 (stating that according to the Agreement Israeli goods have duty-free access to the US market, and so do Palestinian goods, because they are marked "Made in Israel.") Furthermore, in October 1995 the United States and the PLO "took the first steps towards the creation of a US-Palestinian Free Trade Agreement under which the United States will not impose customs duties on Palestinian goods." This US-Palestinian Free Trade Agreement will "eliminate the tariff advantage Israeli goods had over Palestinian goods under the Israel FTA." See id.

³⁶See id.

³⁷See id., supra note 11, at 164 (arguing that "access to the Israeli market and other regional and global markets" for the Palestinian goods and labor has been frustrated). Foreign investors have been deterred by "the disruption of trade caused by the border closures, combined with problems plaguing the aid program, the disrupted trade situation and the lack of foreign investment has eroded confidence in the entire peace process." See id.

³⁸See id. at 160, 167 (stating that the customs union has some attributes of a free trade model, but is largely based on Israeli customs rules and tariffs rates). During negotiations of the Economic Protocol "the Palestinians pushed for a free trade arrangement while the Israelis wanted a customs union because they did not want to recognize Palestinian borders as would be required by a free trade area"). In addition, the Israelis wanted the customs union "to prevent leakage of low-tariff imported goods from the Palestinian Territories into Israel." Moreover, traditionally "a free trade area is distinct from a customs union, which is sometimes also called a common market". While both a free trade area and a customs union attempt to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce among the states involved, "the customs union also involves harmonizing duties and other commerce regulations of all participating states that are applied against all other countries." See id.

³⁹See id. (citing Keith C. Molkner, noting that "‘real economic growth that is rapid, profound, and sustained’ was a major criterion of successful implementation of Palestinian autonomy").

⁴⁰See Economic Protocol, supra note 25, at art. III(2). These goods can be found in Lists A1 and A2 in Appendix I of the Economic Protocol.

⁴¹See id. art. III(10).

⁴²See id. art. III(4) (stating that these goods are contained in List B in Appendix III of the Economic Protocol.

⁴³See Fidler, supra note 11, at 167 (arguing that the Palestinians traded lower prices for imported products (Israeli tariff rates are higher than the would-be Palestinian rates) for freedom of movement of Palestinian goods and labor into Israel).

⁴⁴See id. (quoting Molkner as saying that the customs union "weakens the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to negotiate favorable trade terms with third countries"). The PA cannot offer lower export tariffs to other countries to make their goods more attractive, because they are locked in the customs union operated according to the Israeli tariff duties. However, there is a benefit to the Palestinians being involved in the customs union with Israel, as "when Israel has a preferential trading arrangement with another country, Palestinian goods receive the same treatment." But, unfortunately many countries that Palestinians are interested to export to, are not interested in dealing with Israel. See id.

⁴⁵See id. (stating that partly, PNA looses revenue because Palestinian businesses use Israeli importers (which dominated the Palestinian market), where the goods "really destined for the Palestinian Territories are marked as Israeli imports"). The Economic Protocol states that the tariff revenues are to be collected by the PA, and is "fundamental to the revenue performance of the PNA, which has surpassed all expectations and .. was continuing to yield surprisingly buoyant receipts." See id. But see id. (citing the Economic Protocol supra note 24, at art. III(15)). The Economic Protocol specifies, however, that the revenues are to flow to the Palestinian Authority only "when the final destination explicitly stated in the import documentation is a corporation registered by the PA and conducting business actively in the Areas" (emphasis added).

⁴⁶See id. at 167, 168, fn 79 (citing Ussama Dabbagh, who argues that "trade diversion has been caused by the imposition of Israeli customs tariffs on imports from the rest of the world"). See id. at 169 (citing that the customs union limits Palestinian exports by limiting what the Palestinians can offer other countries in terms of access to the Palestinian market and by Palestinian dependency on Israel.) A World Bank estimations made in 1993, where "absent the asymmetrical trading structures imposed on the Palestinian Territories by Israel during occupation, the West Bank and Gaza would have purchased only 36% of total imports from Israel (compared with the actual figure of 90% during the mid-1980’s), and sold 20% of total exports to Israel (compared with the actual figure of 75% during the mid-1980’s")). The report also noted that "the Palestinian trade with the rest of the Arab world would have been much higher, with 40% of Palestinian exports flowing to Arab countries." See id. at 170, 171 (stating that the Palestinians signed an Trade Cooperation Agreement with Jordan in 1995, and with Egypt in 1997, but the customs union restricts what the Palestinians can offer to the both countries, in terms of preferential access to the Palestinian market). The PA can offer Jordanian goods only limited preferential treatment under the restricted areas in which the PA can establish tariff duties. Furthermore, Israeli border closures hinder export of potential Palestinian enterprises (because the closures affect Palestinian access to Egypt and Jordan) and deter foreign investors who consider exporting to or through the Territories. See id.

⁴⁷See id. at 169 (stating that an importer has to deal with three sets of rules put forth by: the Economic Protocol, Israel, and the Palestinians).

⁴⁸See Economic Protocol, supra note 25, art. IX § 5 cl. b.

⁴⁹See Fidler, supra note 11, at 169.

⁵⁰ See id. at 173, 174 (noting that due to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, the existing free trade agreement between the European Union and Israel, the Palestinians are able to grant Europeans a reciprocal free access to Palestinian market (hereinafter Euro-Mediterranean Agreement)). European Union provided trade concessions to certain Palestinian products since 1986, and that under European Union regulations, "all Palestinian manufactured products enjoy free access to the Community market and key Palestinian agricultural products are granted ... free or confessional access". The author also notes that in 1996 the EU and the PLO initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation between the European Community and the PLO for the Benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Interim Association Agreement forms part of a larger European Union initiative called the European Mediterranean Partnership launched in November 1995 that is designed to create a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area through bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Agreements between the European Union and countries in the MENA region. Prior to the Interim Association Agreement, the European Union had concluded Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Israel, Tunisia, and Morocco." See id.

⁵¹See id. at 174 (Despite the limitations of the customs union and Israel’s border closures, Palestinians are unable to export to the MENA region due to the region’s high tariff rates. "MENA countries generally have high tariff rates to protect domestic enterprises, which discourages exporters in other MENA countries and eliminates the incentives for protected firms to be competitive by exploring to other regional and global markets." As a result, intra-regional trade within the MENA area is very low, "accounting for only seven to eight per cent of total MENA trade. Unless the trade policies of MENA countries changes dramatically, the MENA area may not offer much hope for Palestinian exports).

⁵²See id. (arguing that "the geographic advantage that the MENA region used to have - because Eastern Europe was effectively closed to open exchange with the West - has now disappeared"). The Central and Eastern European countries ("CEECs") are now "reclaiming their geographical advantage, allowing them to ‘exploit sub- contracting of manufacturing products for export to the European Union to a much greater degree than the MENA countries." See id.

⁵³See id. ("Under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Union and Tunisia, materials originating in Morocco (which also has a trade agreement with the European Union) shall be considered as originating in Tunisia for purposes of the European Union-Tunisia rules of origin. Technically, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Union and Tunisia does not accord Palestinian-originating products the benefit of liberal rules of origin because it does not include the Palestinian Territories in the list of MENA countries to which the cumulative rules of origin apply, but the European and Tunisia might allow Palestinian-originating products to benefit from these rules of origin").

⁵⁴See id. (stating that the European Union may grant the benefits under the cumulative rules of origin to products that originated in the Territories, however, not under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement). The Agreement has no discussion on the rules of origin, largely because Israeli customs rules control such questions under the customs union. Thus, increased Palestinian export to the MENA region is theoretically possible, but unrealistic, due to freezing of free movement of goods consequential to security-driven border closures with Israel. As long as Israel feels insecure and administers border closures, and while Palestinians cannot export the goods themselves, foreign customers will find business elsewhere, and the Palestinian economy will continue to stagnate. See id.

⁵⁵See Memorandum, supra note 2, (specifying Israeli security concerns in Part I and II of the Memorandum). Part I addresses three phases of further Israeli redeployments from the Territories, allowing for Israeli forces to remain in certain "Green Areas/Nature Reserves" for the purposes of "protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism." In addition, "activities and movements of the Palestinian Police forces may be carried out after coordination and confirmation (with Israeli forces) and the Israeli side will respond to such requests expeditiously." Part II, § A addresses specific issues of Israeli security including, Outlawing and Combating Terrorist Organizations; Prohibiting Illegal Weapons; and Preventing Incitement. Part II, § B specifically addresses issues in Security Cooperation, including Bilateral Cooperation (Israeli-Palestinian joint effort to combat terrorism), Forensic Cooperation, Trilateral Committee (U.S.-Paletsinian-Israli joint effort to combat terrorism). Part II, § C addresses Other Issues, including Palestinian Police Force; amending of the PLO Charter; Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters; Human Rights and the Rule of Law. See id.

⁵⁶See id. (providing provisions for further bilateral economic cooperation in Part III, § 1-7, titled Interim Committees and Economic Issues). Clearly, Israeli security remains a major focus of this peace process, demonstrated by putting security provisions before economic ones in the Memorandum. See id.

⁵⁷ See id. See also American Israel Public Affairs Committee, A Brief Overview of the Wye River Memorandum, [hereinafter AIPAC] <http://206.55.43.128/rsult.cfm?id=14> (stating that Prime Minister Netanyahu said "I will hand them land if they will assure me they will fight the terrorists"). If the Memorandum is implemented, Palestinians will have "full control over 18 percent of the West Bank and civilian control over another 22 percent." See id.

⁵⁸See id. Part IV (setting the goal for both sides "to immediately resume permanent status negation on an accelerated basis" and "to achieve the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999").

⁵⁹See id. Part V (prohibiting either side from "initiating or taking any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement").

⁶⁰See id. Attachment (noting that the time line is an "integral attachment" and that the "topics not included in the time line follow the schedule provided for in the text of the Memorandum").

⁶¹See AIPAC, supra note 71, What Palestinians Gain from the Wye River Memorandum, (Oct. 30, 1998) (stating that if the agreement is implemented, Palestinians will control "sixfold the amount of land" than before, i.e. "99 percent of the Palestinians will live under their own rule in 40 percent of the West Bank"; "18 percent of the West Bank, where more than half of the Palestinian population is concentrated will be under complete Palestinian control; and "in 22 percent of the West Bank, Palestinians will exercise civil control").

⁶²See id. (claiming that 25 percent of the land over the Yarkon aquifer, the key water resource for Israel, will be in Palestinian-controlled territory").

⁶³See Memorandum, supra note 54, (providing that security provisions are the largest part of the Memorandum, while economic provisions are second largest.)

⁶⁴See id., Part III, § 1 (reaffirming the commitment of the parties "to continue or to reactivate all standing committees ... including the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), the Civil Affairs Committee (CAC), the Legal Committee, and the Standing Cooperation Committee").

⁶⁵See id. § 2 (stating that both sides have agreed on specific arrangement to open the Gaza Industrial Estate and concluded a "Protocol Regarding the Establishment and Operation of the International Airport in the Gaza Strip During the Interim Period"). See also AIPAC, supra note 60 (stating that creation of the new industrial park on the border of Gaza and Israel will create 20,000 jobs for the Palestinians.) In addition, as the park opens "numerous joint private economic ventures will be launched to help the Palestinian economy as well as to increase of peaceful cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis." See id.

⁶⁶See id. See AIPAC, supra note 61 (arguing that "Palestinians will operate both the airport and the most visible aspects of the airport security; Israelis will play a discreet behind-the-scenes role" and "Palestinians will no longer need to get approval to travel to Ben Gurion Airport and pass through Israeli security"); See also Gaza International Airport, Palestinian National Authority (Jan. 1999) <http://www.pna.org> (stating that building of the Gaza Airport began in January, 1996, and it was inagurated in November, 1998.)

⁶⁷See id. § 3 (stating that the parties are to negotiate Safe Passage routes as pertaining to the southern and the northern routes, and implement the agreements expeditiously.)

⁶⁸See AIPAC, supra note 61 (providing that "Palestinians will be able to travel without interruption through a large region from Jenin at the northern edge of the West Bank to Nablus," where elimination of Israeli checkpoints will making it more difficult for Israel to prevent terrorist attacks). Furthermore, there will be two corridors established for Palestinians to travel between Gaza and the West Bank, also without Israeli checkpoints. See id.

⁶⁹See Memorandum, supra note 55, § 4 (providing for negotiations by the Israeli-Palestinian Committee on construction and operation of the Port of Gaza to facilitate expansion of the Palestinian trade and further development and independence of the Palestinian economy.)

⁷⁰See id. § 5 (stating that "unresolved legal issues adversely affect the relationship between the two peoples" and "the Legal Committee will address outstanding legal issues and implement solutions to these issues in the shortest possible period," and "the Palestinian side will provide to the Israeli side copies of all of its laws in effect").

⁷¹See id. (assuring that the Committee will focus on four points of conflict: "(1) Israeli purchase taxes; (2) cooperation in combating vehicle theft; (3) dealing with unpaid Palestinian debts; and (4) the impact of Israeli standards as barriers to trade and the expansion of the A1 and A2 lists").

⁷²See id. (stating that the parties agreed to pledge for increased assistance from international donors and convince the donor community to organize a Ministerial Conference before the end of 1998 for that purpose.)

⁷³See Embassy of the State of Israel in Washington, D.C., The Peace Process: Reference Documents, <http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp> (listing documents pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict starting with the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 and ending with the Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998).

⁷⁴See Philips But see AIPAC, The Peace Process: A Brief Overview of the Wye River Memorandum, (1998) <http://206.55.43.128/result.cfm?id=14> (stating that "the Administration, Congress and the government of Israel will need to continue working together closely as the peace process enters its next phase"). Supporters of Israel "will play an important role in encouraging this cooperation and ensuring Palestinian compliance in meeting Israel’s security needs." See id.

⁷⁵See Memorandum, supra note 2, Preamble of the Memorandum (stating steps of implementing this Memorandum are "subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do not superseded their other requirements").

⁷⁶See Filling Holes in Oslo Accords, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs #85, Oct. 27, 1998 (stating that "the Israelis have now given 40% of the land; 97% of the population; powers of police, education and taxation; and a variety of security-related points (no inspections of Arafat’s airplane when he lands in Gaza and no inspection of Palestinians traveling along the safe-passageway between Gaza and the West Bank are two of the new ones"). While the Palestinians "have promised yet again to change their Covenant, modify the size and composition of the their police force, stop the incitement to violence and destroy the terrorist infrastructure - no more than they promised in 1993." See id.

⁷⁷See Forth Interim Report Card: Israeli-Palestinian Compliance With the Wye River Memorandum, Americans For Peace Now, Press Release, Dec. 19, 1998 - Jan. 29, 1999 <http://www.peacenow.org> (stating that on December 20, 1998, the Israeli Cabinet formally approved Prime Minister Netanyahu’s proposal that Israel not move forward with Wye implementation unless the Palestinians meet five specific conditions," while the United States State Department claimed that Palestinians were "working hard to implement many of their commitments") (emphasis added). This kind of rhetoric raises a few questions: What is the meaning of working hard? Is it enough for the Palestinians to be complying with many of their commitments, when they are supposed to be complying will all of the agreed commitments?

⁷⁸See The Wye Agreement - More of the Same, JINSA, Oct. 27, 1998 <http://www.jinsa.org/infovault/iss> (arguing that "I am haunted by the fact that these very same commitments have been made three times before - at Oslo I, Oslo II, and in the Hebron Accords, the Palestinians have not kept the promises then, and I wonder why anyone feels that this time they will"). See Hard Road to Peace, The Economist, Dec. 12-18, 1998, at 21 (arguing that as the Wye was signed many Palestinians reacted with violence when they found out that Israel was going to release common criminals and not political criminals). The Israeli government responded the previous week that "freeing people ‘with blood on their hands,’ or Hamas members was no part of Wye, and that it would stop implementing the accord unless the Palestinian Authority admitted as much, halted and punished violence and incitement to it, and renounced Mr. Arafat’s threat o declare a Palestinian state next May whether Israel agreed or not." See id. See also Analysis: Wye deal is off the rails? BBC News (Dec. 7, 1998) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid> (stating that "Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet is said to have watched TV pictures of the attack on the two Israelis and the cabinet decided unanimously to suspend the Wye River Agreement").

⁷⁹See JINSA, supra note 76

⁸⁰See id. (stating that the CIA is a "troublesome element" as an addition to the players of the peace process).

⁸¹See id. (stating that "the CIA’s job is to gather and assess intelligence information").

⁸²See id.

⁸³See JINSA, supra note 78 (arguing that if the CIA "can overlook so much with Saddam Hussein, an avowed enemy, how will they treat Yasser Arafat whom they have forgotten is an enemy").

⁸⁴See JINSA, supra note 76.

⁸⁵See id. (citing Morris Amitay, a Vice Chairman of JINSA, saying that, "it is fair to assume the CIA will get the same kind of political guidance this Administration gave the UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq, to wit, avoid finding violations in order to avoid having to do something about them").

⁸⁶See id. (quoting Hillary Clinton on May 6, 1998 saying "it would be in the long-term interests of the Middle East for Palestine to become a state").

⁸⁷See Phillips, note 18 (stating that Albright made it clear that "if Netanyahu did not fall into line... the Administration was willing to risk damaging U.S.-Israeli relations").

⁸⁸See infra note 98 (arguing that actions of the President "either reflect the President’s fundamental belief that the Palestinians - not the Israelis - are American’s best deserving allies, or they are desperate measures to avoid admitting failure"). The author states that "either way, the Palestinians are encouraged to continue behaviors, including violence, which bode ill for Israel and the region." Furthermore, the President promising the Palestinians $400 million in aid acts an a reinforcement for violence. See id.

⁸⁹See Phillips, supra note 18.

⁹⁰See id. (arguing that "the only acceptable arbiter of Israeli security should be the Israeli government").

⁹¹See id. (stating that three-way arbitration on whether Palestinians are keeping their end of the bargain means that Israel is looking at ‘majority rules’ on the single issue that is the heart and soul of sovereign responsibility").

⁹²See id.

⁹³See JINSA, supra note 78.

⁹⁴See id. (comparing the CIA to the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) that was keeping peace in Sinai.) After 20 years, "Israel and Egypt want it [the MFO] - rather than each other - to be responsible for maintaining peace in Sinai. See id.

⁹⁵Art. II.A.1(b). See generally Sec. II. (lacking a provision stating that Israel must participate in the evaluation of Palestinian compliance with security measures.)

⁹⁶See id.

⁹⁷See AIPAC, supra note 74.

⁹⁸See Wye Bother?, JINSA(Dec. 10, 1998) <http://www.jinsa.org/> (asserting that Oslo provided for the "safety valve" in case of Palestinians breaking their promises allowing Israel to halt her compliance.)

⁹⁹See id. See also Bar-Illan, supra note 18 ("Yitzhak Rabin used to say that Oslo agreements were full of holes. Yet the fundamental problem was not the inadequacy of the agreement’s provisions, but the assumption that the Palestinian Authority intended to keep them").

¹⁰⁰See id.

¹⁰¹See The Palestinians and the Implementation of the Wye River Memorandum, AIPAC (Dec. 21, 1998) <http://206.55.43.128/result> ("Regrettably, other than improving security cooperation," and possibly amending the PLO Charter of the provisions that call for the destruction of Israel, "the Palestinians have done little to implement their Wye commitments").

¹⁰²See id.

¹⁰³See Clarence H. Wagner, Arabic Media - Not a Word of Peace, Bridges for Peace, (Mar. 1998) (citing Mr. Jacoby from the Boston Globe writing that in 1993 Arafat signed the "land for peace" agreement with Rabin and Peres and pledged in writing that "the PLO would revoke its charter, the Palestinian National Covenant, which calls explicitly for Israel’s destruction," and abandon all anti-Israel and anti-Jew propaganda.) Arafat shook Rabin’s hand and "solemnly agreed to exhort all Palestinians to reject terrorism and violence" and speaking to his people about it was "the least of his obligations." Since 1993, Arafat has been praising the peace-process when speaking to foreign audiences in English, but has been consistently failing to do so when speaking to his own people (and other Arabic-speaking audiences) in Arabic. See id.

¹⁰⁴See The Palestinian National Charter, art. 33, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, <http:www.israel-mfa.gov.il>.

¹⁰⁵See David Makovsky and Nitzan Horowitz, Clinton Visit Likely to Settle Charter Issue, Ha’aretz, Dec. 13, 1998 <http://3www.haaretz.co.il/> (stating that the Palestinian National Council (PNC) members showed their supported for amending the Charter by the show of hands, while the PNC rules call for a 2/3 vote of all members in order to make any changes to the Charter.) (emphasis added). During the Wye summit Netanyahu agreed to " the quorum issue as long as the nullification was public, since the main point was educational rather than legal." See id. See also Israel Satisfied with PNC Vote; Expects Further Steps, Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem (Dec. 14, 1998) <gopher://israel-onfo-gov.il:> (citing David Bar-Illan, Director of the Policy and Planning Division at the Prime Minister’s Office, noting that "Israel hopes the nullification is not only formal, but will be of substance, meaning that it will affect statements made by Palestinian officials, the content in Palestinian school textbooks, and the Palestinian media").

¹⁰⁶See Memorandum, supra note 2, Part II, § A cl. 1, (3) ("The Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions of threats of violence or terror"). See also AIPAC, supra note 96.

¹⁰⁷See id. AIPAC (quoting Abu Alaa saying "the leadership of [the intifada] that threw stones is ready to return and use stones to free the people and the land"). The next day a Palestinian mob "attempted to lynch two Israelis near Ramallah." The strongest support for the PA’s direct involvement in this incitement of violence "was demonstrated by the immediate end of the riots in response to U.S. demands on the eve of President Clinton’s visit." See id. See also Bridges for Peace, Quotes: "Let Them Speak for Themselves," <http://207.204.64.46/dfjqoutes598.htm> (citing the student branch of Chairman Arafat’s Fatah faction of the PLO in Nablus during the commemoration of Land Day on March 29, 1998, saying "Gather together, O fighters of Karameh, Litani and Beirut... raise your voices aloud: we shall die, we shall die, so that Palestine shall live... our blood is your atonement, O Jerusalem, and our souls are your defenders, O Palestine... we swear unto the holy martyrs: until victory!"). Moreover, Palestinian Television broadcasts a children’s Sesame Street-like T.V., which is funded by the U.S. dollars, where children make statements like, "Palestine! Amidst the shooting of the revolution, I turn to you with my blood and the blood of my brother and of the son of my neighbors. My heart will cleanse your image. Allah is great! Allah is great!" and "When I wonder into the entrance of Jerusalem, I will turn into a suicide warrior in battle dress! In battle dress!" See id.

¹⁰⁸See Bar-Illan, supra note 18.

¹⁰⁹See id.

¹¹⁰See Levine, supra note 7 (arguing that "merchandise exports in 1991 brought in 37% fewer dollars than in 1987 as the Israeli regulatory regime restricted the movements of goods and people" and "none of this was improved, by Palestinians’ official and psychological support for Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War"). Moreover, "besides the immediate restrictions wrought by this existential danger to Israel during the Gulf War itself, Iraq’s defeat brought a termination of reliable Palestinian employment in Kuwait and throughout the Gulf. Workers who once provided a steady flow of remittances to their homeland now began returning there themselves in quest for employment, while diminished consumption in the West Bank and Gaza were exacerbating economic decline."

¹¹¹See Our Friends? JINSA, #93 <http://www.jinsa.org.infovault/> (discussing Palestinians burning U.S. and Israeli flags in response to the U.S. bombing Iraq in December 1998). Using rather sharp sarcasm the article points out that "when President Clinton visited Gaza, the flag makers went into overdrive to produce enough American flags to drape from the Parliament and hand out to the crowds. Nary a one was burned. Facing an oversupply of American flags, the flag makers worried about a slump in sales. So the President ordered the bombing of Iraq, drawing thousands of Palestinians into the streets to burn up the inventory." See id.

¹¹²See Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem, December 10, 1998 (citing Ma’ariv (an Israeli newspaper) reporting that Arafat declared the day before in Hebron that "a Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital would be established whether Israel likes it or not," adding that "the Palestinians would free the land centimeter by centimeter until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state"). But see World: Middle East Palestinians Demand Statehood Talks, BBC News, Feb. 22, 1999 <http://news.bbc.uk/hi/english/world> ("But there have been indications over recent weeks that Mr. Arafat may be seeking to delay the declaration until after the Israeli elections in May"). The Israeli elections have now been moved forward to May 17th and the benefits of declaring a Palestinian state are no longer so clear. With the possibility of a new government being voted in, the prospects for peace no longer seem as bleak. And in the short term, Benjamin Netanyahu might live up to his threat to send Israeli troops to annex Palestinian territories [if the unilateral declaration of statehood takes place]. An international request for the Palestinians to delay the declaration until after elections would make it much easier for them to do so, whilst they would also welcome in creased foreign support for a future declaration." See also Jumana Abu Zayyad, Unequal Partners in the Peace Process: A Palestinian Perspective <gopher://gopher-igcc.ucsd.edu/> (describing the Palestinian dilemma as "[a]ny perceived weakness on the part of the Palestinian Authority in its dealings with Israel diminishes the credence and approbation accorded it by the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian public.... To maintain internal legitimacy, the Palestinian Authority must prove that t can secure Palestinian national interests, and not merely act as ‘Israel’s police in the West Bank and Gaza’").

¹¹³See Memorandum, supra note 2, Part V.

¹¹⁴See Memorandum, supra note 2, Part II, § A cl. 1. See also AIPAC, supra note 96 (claiming that the U.S. agrees that the PNA is able to halt Hamas operations, but has been unwilling to do so, especially in the West Bank.) See also Louis Rene Beres, Israel’s Freeing of Terrorists is Contrary to International Law, 73 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1, 7 (1995) [hereinafter Beres] (arguing that Arafat himself is a known terrorist with Israeli blood on his hands). In 1994 Shimon Prachik (an officer in the Israeli Defense Forces reserves) and Moshe Lorberaum (a victim of 1978 bus bombing carried out by the PLO) filed a petition in Israel’s High Court of Justice charging Arafat with terrorist crimes. The petition stated that "Arafat, prima facie, had been responsible for numerous terror attacks in Israel and abroad, including murder, airplane hijacking, hostage-taking, letter bombing, and hijacking of ships on the high seas." Moreover, the petitions’ allegations of Arafat’s personal and direct involvement in various terrorist attacks was confirmed on July 13, 1994, by Dr. Ahmad Tibi, Arafat’s most senior advisor: "the person responsible on behalf of the Palestinian people for everything that was done in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Yasser Arafat... and this man shook hands with Yitzhak Rabin." See id.

¹¹⁵See Memorandum, supra note 2 Part II, § A cl. 2. See also id. AIPAC (claiming that the PA submitted only 200 illegal weapons to the U.S. authorities, out of the tens of thousands circulated within the Territories.)

¹¹⁶See id. AIPAC ("U.S. peace envoy Dennis Ross condemned the Palestinian rioting, and confirmed that, contrary to Palestinians claims, Israel had never committed to release such prisoners ["with blood on their hands], in fact, he said [the Prime Minister] "has been doing on this issue what he said he would do").

¹¹⁷See supra note 106.

¹¹⁸See Beres, supra note 106 at 3, 4 (arguing that Israel’s releasing of convicted terrorists is contrary to Israel’s national security interests and a violation of international law.) "Terrorism is an established crime under international law. An authoritative listing of particular offenses that comprise this crime can be found in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Moreover, some of the Palestinian prisoners now are being released are also guilty of related crimes of war and even crimes against humanity, crimes so egregious that the perpetrators are known in law as hostes humani generis, "common enemies of humankind." In this connection, we should recall that units of the Palestinian Liberation Army served with Saddam Hussein’s forces in occupied Kuwait, making them, and Yasser Arafat personally (the legal principle of command responsibility is known in law as respondeat superior) complicit in multiple crimes of extraordinary horror and ferocity. And if these offenses were not enough of n affront to world legal order, many of the terrorists now being released from Israeli jails are immediately assuming high positions in the Palestinian Authority’s various police and security services." See id.

¹¹⁹See Phillips, supra note 18 ("Arafat has failed to keep his Oslo commitments to fight terrorism by systematically cracking down on radical Palestinian groups violently opposed to the negotiations"). Instead, the Palestinian police has "intermittently arrested Islamic militants after terrorist attacks to placate the Israelis, and then quietly released them or allowed them to ‘escape.’" Arafat’s administration allowed the expansion of the police force far beyond "the 24,000 personnel permitted by the 1995 Oslo II agreement, contains an estimated 150 members of extremist groups opposed to peace with Israel; at least 25 are wanted by Israel for terrorist crimes." Moreover, Palestinian police have been involved covertly in terrorist attacks against Israelis since the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Palestinians also have refused to "extradite known terrorists accused of murders on Israeli soil - another violation of the Oslo Accords." See id.

¹²⁰See Fidler, supra note 11 at 182 (citing the findings of the World Bank in 1997 after its review of the West Bank and Gaza, "while the consequences of terrorist acts and subsequent border closings no doubt complicated Palestinian legal reform efforts, the blame cannot be laid entirely at Israel’s doorstep"). The World Bank also noted that "in connection with the Law on the Encouragement of Investment, for example, the timely and adequate drafting of this major piece of legal reform ‘was in the hands of the Palestinians themselves, and they had an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that they understood the importance of foreign direct investment to the achievement of peace and Palestinian autonomy." See id.

¹²¹See Fidler, supra note 35, at 549 (claiming that Gaza and the West Bank have different legal systems due to their different historical development). Gaza law is a "mixture of Ottoman and British law," while the "West Bank law is influenced more heavily by the Jordanian legal system as modified by Israeli military orders." See id.

¹²²See id. (stating that another reason for the complexity of the legal systems of the Territories is the "lack of transparency" and that the commercial law that does exist, "must be updated to reflect contemporary international practice"). It might be too expensive for foreign companies to try to "muddle through" the existing provisions. See also id. at 547 (arguing that "investment in the Territories seems risky because the PNA had not created institutions and procedures readily comprehensible to the international business community"). For example, although foreign private investment was considered by all parties to the peace process as critical to its success, "the PNA did not adopt a foreign investment law until April 1995." Before the Investment Law was adopted, "how a foreign investor was to structure an investment, to whom the investment proposal should be made, and how the investment would be treated by the PNA in the future remained subject to ad hoc decisions and agreements absent any transparency or predictability." Moreover, Fidler exemplifies mistrust of foreign business in a situation where "Arafat’s handling of the contract to develop the Palestinian telephone system, in which Arafat essentially awarded an exclusive contract to two different companies while continuing to negotiate with a third, did little to bolster the foreign business community’s confidence in dealing with the PNA"). See id.

¹²³See id. (providing that the World Bank’s hope that "the peace process should make possible a thorough review and overhaul of the existing legal and regulatory framework to provide the private sector with a sounder legal basis for commercial transactions," has not been fulfilled.)

¹²⁴See Fidler, supra note 11, at 182 (stating that in 1997, in its review of the West Bank and Gaza, the World Bank concluded that "in addition to political uncertainty, the business environment suffers from confusing commercial legislation and a lack of public sector regulatory institutions"). World Bank experts, "lawyers working to promote the peace process, international legal scholars, and potential foreign investors quickly perceived that the Investment Law was a very flawed document." See id.

¹²⁵See Fidler, supra note 34, at 547 (claiming that the peace process opened up economic opportunities in Israel and Jordan, signified by business conferences held in Casablanca, Amman, and Jerusalem in 1994 and 1995 when Israel signed peace agreements with Jordan and the PLO, respectively). In addition, the Arab states were foregoing the boycott against Israel as a consequence of the abovementioned peace agreements, making the growing Israeli economy attractive for investment and trade. Foreign investors preferred Israeli market for investment due to "its stability, its [Israel’s] history of friendly relations with the democratic West, and its economic dominance in the region, [making] it a safe investment location when compared to the truncated, poverty-ridden, and tumultuous Palestinian Territories." Moreover, another reason for Jordanian and Israeli markets being attractive to foreign enterprises is the legal and administrative stability established in Israel and Jordan. See id.

¹²⁶See Fidler supra, note 35 at 540 (Arafat established Palestine Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction) [hereinafter PECDAR] on October 31, 1993, to act as the link between the PNA and the international donor community, but the PLO took six months establish it).

¹²⁷See id. (stating that the donor countries "expressed frustration at how long Arafat took to establish and staff PECDAR"). As PLO complained about delays in aid, the U.S. and E.U. officials responded that "there was no one to give aid to because the PLO had failed to create an aid infrastructure." Israeli officials also "expressed concern about the PLO’s failure to appoint persons to key economic and financial positions." Furthermore, Palestinians criticized Arafat for appointing close political allies instead of professional economists and financial experts to work on PECDAR. See id. See also Levine, supra note 7 (stating that there is no shortage of investors wanting to bring their business into the region, "express frustration about: OPIC’s [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] seemingly impossible terms for loan qualification, the resultant absence of private sector financing resources in a high risk region, the void in formal Palestinian commercial law, the undocumented restrictions they invariably encounter at Israeli ports, and the absence of any long-term infrastructural road map in public sector Palestinian planing").

¹²⁸See id. ("The Palestinian Authority exclusively controls, for example, the importation of many products, including cement, petroleum, and flour. In some situations, Israel supports these trade monopolies in order to protect Israeli suppliers from competition in the Palestinian market." In addition, there is evidence that all revenues do not go to the Palestinian Authority and private enterprises because "Arafat reportedly takes a cut of the money").

¹²⁹See Stacy Lakid and Yigal Carmon, The PA Economy - Free Market or Keleptocracy, The Middle East Media & Research Institute, (Jan. 7, 1999) [http://www.memri.org] ("Operating with official backing, PADICO dominates the PA economy through a netwok of confidants who are appointed as members of interlocking Boards of Directors of both PADICO and its different subsidiaries"). Furthermore, the company owns shares of its subsidearies in violation of its by-laws, and the nepotistic Al-Masri family "dominates the boards of PADICO and its subsidiaries." See id.

¹³⁰See Fidler, note 11 at 183.

¹³¹See id, supra note 35 at 547.

¹³²See Fidler, supra note 11 at 180, 181 (presenting a letter of April 4, 1997, written by Gershon Baskin, the Israeli director Bethlehem-based Israel/Palestinian Center for Research and Information, to President Clinton.) The letter urged the United States to influence the PNA to "put an end to monopolistic Palestinian Authority policies that ‘will strangle the private sector and delay or prevent economic development.’" See id.

¹³³See id. (claiming that "[t]he lack of an adequate and functioning system of commercial law, combined with heavy government intervention in the economy, is a recipe for corruption," which the Palestinian Authority is rife with.)

¹³⁴See id. (citing an article from the Wall Street Journal.)

¹³⁵See id. (citing findings of David Hurst of The Guardian).

¹³⁶See id. ("Arafat and his coterie of unofficial economic ‘advisors’ have thrown up a ramshackle, nepotistic edifice of monopoly, racketeering and naked extortion which merely enriches them as it further impoverishes society at large"). See also Berman, infra note 131 (arguing that "Ministers and Palestinian officials have consistently misappropriated internationally-provided funds intended for much-needed social services for the Palestinian people" and "prominent instances of embezzlement and graft show a profound disregard for the poverty and social malaise plaguing the Palestinian community").

¹³⁷See id.

¹³⁸See Ilan Berman, Viewpoint, The Uncertain Future of Palestinian Government, JINSA (Sep. 28, 1998) <http://www.jinsa.org/infovault> (stating that Arafat assigned the Palestinian Auhority’s Public Monitoring and Audit Department to investigate corruption in his government.) The findings indeed showed corruption, "the Audit Office’s commission... found bribery, extortion and graft" and "Jarar Kidwa, the Palestinain Authority’s chief auditor, highlighted the presence of ‘dangerous financial and administrative negligence.’" The 1997 report by the Audit Office found that, "‘serious financial and administrative violations were commited by most of the Palestinian Authority’s ministries and other institutions,’ totaling the loss at a staggering $223 million dollars." See id.

¹³⁹See id. ("The Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council have publicly condemned the current government, calling for internal investigations and proposing changes in governing styles. Despite growing calls for reform, however, efforts to rectify the dishonesty plaguing the Palestinian Authority have been strikingly absent"). However, "recent attempts to address popular calls for reform have resulted in a reshuffling of the cabinet that is cosmetic at best," and "this failure to take decisive action has been directly linked to Arafat’s dropping status in the polls, as the Palestinian people become increasingly aware of the entrenchment of dishonest dealings within the government." See id.

¹⁴⁰See Fidler, supra note 11 at 183 (claiming that "international donors, mostly from the European Union, threatened to cut off $1.4 billion of aid pledged but not yet paid to Palestine when they got wind of the extent of he corruption problem").

¹⁴¹See Berman, supra note 131 (claiming that Hamas protests any negotiations with Israel, and to them the possibility of peace with Israel signifies an "unacceptable abandonment of the underlying principles of Islam and Arabic culture"). Moreover, to sustain their popularity with the Palestinian populace, Hamas can capitalize PA’s corruption by "providing necessary social services which the PA government cannot, or chooses not to provide" in addition to combating "unemployment and disease plaguing the Palestinian community." The perpetuation of corruption of the Palestinian Authority, under the "auspices of Yassir Arafat, may play a large part in ensuring Hamas’ success." See id.

¹⁴²See Roni N. Halabi, Stability in the Middle East Through Economic Development: An Analysis of the Peace Process, Increased Agricultural Trade, Joint Ventures, and Free Trade Agreements, 2 Drake J. Agric. L. 275 (1997) [hereinafter Halabi] (arguing that "economic interdependence is the most effective means of maintaining peace and increasing normalization"). Moreover, "a positive cycle of peace and economic expansion could beset in motion in the Middle East: strong economic relations would enhance political stability; political stability, in turn, may create more certainty and safety in the market; market stability would then foster economic growth because investor confidence would be bolstered." Halabi also argues that the state of war "makes it impossible for opposing sides to enter into economic relations with each other... and the risk of war alone discourages even internal investment and growth." See id.

¹⁴³See id. (arguing that "the governments in the Middle East must adopt export-led growth strategies to increase their balance of payments to absorb the payments for importing food and creating jobs for their youth").

¹⁴⁴See Prospects For Trade in Palestine, Palestinian Econ. Pulse <http://www.palecon.org/pulsedir/> (stating that "despite a surplus of agricultural produce there has been a decline in agricultural exports and increase in local competition"... and "the nature of demand in export markets has changed due to Jordanian quotas and the increasing competition in foreign and local markets").

¹⁴⁵See Ossama Dabbagh, Prospects For Trade in Palestine, Palestinian Econ. Pulse, <http://www.palecon.org/pulsedir/july/trade.html>

¹⁴⁶See id.

¹⁴⁷See Halabi, supra note 142. (quoting Richards arguing "Middle Eastern political economies will have to emulate other economically successful but agricultural-resource-poor nations [such as Singapore or Korea] to achieve food security in the years ahead").

¹⁴⁸See id.

¹⁴⁹See Development in Palestine: A New Direction, Palestinian Econ. Pulse, <http://www.palecon.org/pulsedir/> (criticizing the PA for putting too much emphasis on establishing inadequate and understaffed ministries.) "Active, imaginative ministers with well-organized, small teams tackling the productive sectors are fundamental and overdue." See id.

¹⁵⁰See The Respective Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, Palestinian Econ. Pulse,<http://www.palecon.org/pulsedir/>. See also id. (arguing that the PNA should "cease to emit signals to the private sector that the key to success lies in gaining a preferred position, a concession or a monopoly... Part of a government’s responsibility is ensuring that the private sector is not exploiting the citizen").

¹⁵¹See Halabi, supra note 142 (describing the concept of food security, "the food security idea recognizes that we all live in a risky world and seeks to devise public policies to minimize the risk that consumption of food will fall below some minimally accepted level.... [and] A country (or a household) can attain such security in three ways: by producing the food, by trading for it, or by having it given to them").

¹⁵²See supra note 150 (arguing that the public and the private sectors should complement each other.) "Given the predominance of the private sector in Palestine, maintaining its vitality and competitiveness is crucial for economic growth. The government should play a supportive, not competitive, non-obstructionist role in private sector growth. To encourage private savings and investment at high rates, the government has to ensure the existence of the appropriate legal, institutional, regulatory and economic police environments in the country including: a stable macroeconomics framework that ensures low inflation; stable and convertible currency and low public debt; a free trade environment without price controls, administrative allocations or distorting incentives; moderate claim of government on private incomes (taxation), and on financial resources (crowding out private borrowers); a supportive administration and absence of excessive regulations and bureaucratic red tape." See id.

¹⁵³See generally Halabi, supra note 142.

¹⁵⁴See id. at 292.

¹⁵⁵See id. at 293 (quoting Richards).

¹⁵⁶See id. at 287 (providing that in the late 1980s Israel "instituted economic reform and privatization program").

¹⁵⁷See id. at 288.

¹⁵⁸See id. at 293 (arguing that "[t]hese joint ventures would also offer the benefit of having Israel at the crossroads between two continents, since it is the only country in the world that boasts free trade agreements with both the European Union and the United States (and now Canada).... [t]hus, after a degree of local transformation, U.S. products could penetrate both Israeli and European markets duty-free, because the Israeli partner could provide access on competitive duty-free terms").

¹⁵⁹See id. at 288.

¹⁶⁰See id. at 294 [hereinafter FTA] (defining a free trade agreement as "a bilateral arrangement between two governments which provides for mutual removal of tariffs and other trade barriers with respect to goods and services originating in the other country (party to the agreement)").

¹⁶¹See id. ("FTA does not interfere directly with trade relations that each party has with other countries or with political sovereignty, and is not designed to achieve economic or political harmonization," ... thus "the agreements are excellent for gaining successful economic growth, while not compromising national pride and political independence").

¹⁶²See Phillips, supra note 143 (arguing that "Diaspora who have worked in other Arab countries can use their knowledge of the business environment and their contacts as a comparative edge over other non-Arab exporting countries"... and "[s]eeking complimentary production would facilitate Palestinian penetration or re-gaining previous markets such as Jordan").

¹⁶³See id. Trade in Palestine (stating that "Arab countries are a good target market for industrial goods and services"). The Arab market "represents $50-60 billion, [t]ust capturing 1-2% of this market (equivalent to some 40-50% of the territories’ GDP) could mean a breakthrough for the Palestinian economy. See id.